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ABSTRACT
This paper is the preprint of an invited commentary1 on Lake et al’s Behavioral and Brain Sciences
article titled Building machines that learn and think like people [1]. Lake et al’s paper offers a
timely critique on the recent accomplishments in artificial intelligence from the vantage point of
human intelligence, and provides insightful suggestions about research directions for building more
human-like intelligence. Since we agree with most of the points raised in that paper, we will offer a
few points that are complementary.
Introduction
The fact that ‘airplanes do not flap their wings’ is often offered as a reason for not looking to biology for AI insights.
This is ironic because the idea that flapping is not required to fly originated from observing eagles soar on thermals!
The comic strip in Fig. 1 offers a humorous take on the current debate in AI. A flight researcher who does not take
inspiration from birds defines an objective function for flight and ends up creating a catapult. Clearly, a catapult is an
extremely useful invention. It can propel objects through the air, and in some cases it can even be a better alternative
to flying. Just as researchers who are interested in building ‘real flight’ would be well advised to pay close attention
to the differences between catapult flight and the bird flight, researchers who are interested in building ‘human-like
intelligence’ or Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), would be well advised to pay attention to the differences between
the recent successes of Deep Learning and human intelligence. We believe Lake et al’s paper [1] delivers on that front,
and we agree with many of its conclusions.
We dont need to study 
the brain to build AI.  
You see, airplanes dont 
flap their wings....
hmm...can you build a 
flying machine 
according to your 
philosophy?
sure, why not?
Flight Objective Function:
maximize   ||x-x_o|| 
s.t    y > 0
The problem is solved! 
Here is the flying machine!
A catapult?? 
Hey, that is not real 
flight!!
You don't see the biological inspiration? 
Also, this machine just beat the bird 
champion of parabolic flight!
tensor> dy/dx...
tensor>tensor>
              Dileep George
Figure 1: A humorous take on the debate on whether AI can learn anything from the brain.
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Better universal algorithms or more inductive biases?
Learning and inference are instances of optimization algorithms. If we could derive a universal optimization algorithm
that works well for all data, the learning and inference problems for building AGI would be solved as well. Researchers
who work on assumption-free algorithms are pushing the frontier on this question.
Exploiting inductive biases and the structure of the AI problem makes learning and inference more efficient. Our brains
show remarkable abilities to perform a wide variety of tasks on data that look very different. What if all these different
tasks and data have underlying similarities? That would explain why our brains are remarkably adept at a wide range of
problems. Our view is that biological evolution, by trial and error, figured out a set of inductive biases that work well
for learning in this world, and the human brain’s efficiency and robustness derives from these biases. When we look to
neuroscience for guidance, it should be in search of those goldilock set of assumptions that are specific enough to make
learning possible in a short amount of time while general enough to maintain versatility.
Lake’s paper noted that many researchers hope to overcome the need for inductive biases by bringing biological
evolution into the fold of the learning algorithms. We wish to point out that biological evolution had the advantage of
using building blocks (proteins, cells) which obeyed the laws of the physics of the world that these organisms were
evolving to survive in. In this way, assumptions about the world were implicitly baked into the representations that
biological evolution used. Trying to evolve intelligence without assumptions will be significantly harder than biological
evolution, and it might be infeasible. Even with the help of implicit assumptions, Nature took millions of years and
many fortuitous events to evolve human-like intelligence. Therefore it is sensible to take lessons from what it produced.
AGI has one existence proof — our brains. Because of this existence proof, we know that we will one day be able to
build AGI. Our brains are general, but that generality has limits. The success of biological evolution in creating our
brains is not an existence proof for the same process resulting in an arbitrarily powerful intelligence (call it Artificial
Universal Intelligence (AUI)). Like perpetual machines, AUI is easy to imagine, but infeasible to build because it
depends on physically impossible constructs like infinite computing power or infinite amounts of data. Delineating
the limits of generality of human intelligence, and helping to tease apart which of those limits arise from hardware
constraints as opposed to fundamental algorithmic limits is another way in which cognitive science and neuroscience
can help AI research.
Our strategy is to build systems that strongly exploit inductive biases, while keeping open the possibility that some of
those assumptions can be relaxed by advances in optimization algorithms.
What kind of generative model is the brain? Neuroscience can help, not just cognitive
science
The authors offered several compelling arguments for using cognitive science insights. In addition to cognitive science,
neuroscience data can be examined to obtain clues about what kind of generative model the brain implements, and how
this model differs from models being developed in the AI community.
For instance, spatial lateral connections between oriented features are a predominant feature of the visual cortex, and
are known to play a role in enforcing contour continuity. However, lateral connections are largely ignored in current
generative models [2]. Another example is the factorization of contours and surfaces. Evidence indicate that contours
and surfaces are represented in a factored manner in the visual cortex [3], potentially giving rise to the ability of humans
to imagine and recognize objects with surface appearances that are not prototypical — like a blanket made of bananas,
or a banana made of blankets. Similarly, studies on top-down attention demonstrate the ability of the visual cortex to
separate out objects even when they are highly overlapping and transparent [4]. These are just a handful of examples
from the vast repository of information about cortical representations and inference dynamics, all of which could be
used in service of building AGI.
The conundrum of ‘human-level performance’: benchmarks for AGI
We would like to emphasize the meaninglessness of ‘human-level performance’, as reported in mainstream AI
publications and then used as a yardstick to measure our progress towards AGI. Take the case of the DeepQ network
playing ‘breakout’ at a ‘human level’ [5]. We found that even simple changes to the visual environment (as insignificant
as changing the brightness) dramatically and adversely affects the performance of the algorithm, whereas humans are
not affected by such perturbations at all. At this point, it should be well accepted that almost any narrowly defined task
can be ‘solved’ with brute force data and computation, and that any use of ‘human-level’ as a comparison should be
reserved for benchmarks that adhere to the following principles: — 1) learning from few examples, 2) generalizing to
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distributions that are different from the training set, and 3) generalizing to new queries (for generative models) and new
tasks (in the case of agents interacting with an environment)
Message-passing (MP) based algorithms for probabilistic models
While the article makes good arguments in favor of structured probabilistic models, it is surprising that the authors
mentioned only MCMC as the primary tool for inference. Although MCMC has asymptotic guarantees, the speed
of inference in many cortical areas is more consistent with MP-like algorithms that arrive at maximum a-posteriori
solutions using only local computations. Despite lacking theoretical guarantees, MP has been known to work well in
many practical cases, and recently we showed that it can be used for learning of compositional features [6]. There is
growing evidence for the use of MP-like inference in cortical areas [7, 8] and they could offer a happy medium where
inference is fast as in neural networks, while retaining MCMC’s capability for answering arbitrary queries on the model.
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